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This paper provides an empirical investigation of monetary policy in Japan in the zero 
interest rate environment that has held sway since 1999.  In particular, we focus on the 
effects of the zero interest rate commitment and of quantitative monetary easing on medium- 
to long-term interest rates in Japan.  In the study we apply a version of the macro-finance 
approach, involving a combination of estimation of a structural macro-model and calibration 
of time-variant parameters to the yield curve observed in the market.  This enables us to 
decompose interest rates into expectations and risk premium components and simultaneously 
to extract the market’s perception of the Bank of Japan’s (BOJ’s) willingness to carry on its 
zero interest rate policy.    In the analysis we make clear the counterfactual policy that would 
have been practiced in the absence of the actual policies followed by the BOJ since 1999.  
From this analysis, we tentatively conclude that the BOJ’s monetary policy since 1999 has 
functioned mainly through the zero interest rate commitment, which has led to declines in 
medium- to long-term interest rates.  We also find some evidence that, up until the end of 
2003, raising the reserve target may have been perceived as a signal indicating the BOJ’s 
accommodative policy stance although the size of the effect is not large.  The portfolio 
rebalancing effect -- either by the BOJ’s supplying ample liquidity or by its purchases of 
long-term government bonds -- has not been found to be significant.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper provides an empirical investigation of the effects on interest rates of 
the Bank of Japan (BOJ)’s monetary policy adopted since it lowered the short-term 
policy rate to nearly zero in 1999.  The BOJ has carried out essentially two types of 
policy during the period.  First, it has made the so-called zero rate commitment, with 
the exception of August 2000-March 2001, roughly defined as the BOJ’s promise to 
keep its policy rate at zero as long as the economy experiences deflation.    Second, the 
BOJ has supplied more bank reserves (or more strictly, the current account balances at 
the BOJ) than necessary to maintain the short-term interest rate at zero since March 
2001.  While these policies are considered to have influenced a variety of 
macroeconomic variables, this paper focuses on their effects on medium- to long-term 
interest rates on government bonds.  This is because these rates are likely to reflect 
most vividly the market’s perception of current and future monetary policy stance, thus 
enabling convenient empirical examination of this perception with a relatively small 
data set.    Needless to say, these interest rates are at the core of the transmission process 
of monetary policy on the economy.   
A number of authors recently studied the topic of monetary policy under the zero 
lower bound of nominal interest rates.    For example, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) 
and Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (forthcoming) pointed out the importance and 
effectiveness of expectations management in terms of the conduct of monetary policy 
from a theoretical perspective.  Bernanke and Reinhart (2004), Clouse et al. (2003), 
Shirakawa (2002), Meltzer (2001), Oda and Okina (2001), and Svensson (2001) 
presented mainly theoretical or conceptual analyses of alternative strategies for further 
monetary easing under the zero interest rate environment.  The empirical examination 
of the effectiveness of the zero rate commitment or of the QMEP, however, is relatively 
limited, reflecting the unprecedented nature of the recent Japanese situation and thus the 
limited availability of data.  Even with this constraint, Fujiki and Shiratsuka (2002) 
and Okina and Shiratsuka (2004) argued that the zero rate commitment in Japan 
flattened the yield curve.  Kimura et al. (2002) examined whether, apart from the 
conventional interest rate channel, increases in the monetary base had any expansionary 
effect on aggregate demand and concluded that such effect, if any, in Japan was 
extremely small and uncertain.  More recently, Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) 
conducted an empirical assessment of these effects for both the United States and Japan 
with an “event study” approach and a “macro-finance,” no-arbitrage model of the term 
structure, and found some evidence that central bank communications could help to  2
shape public expectations of future policy actions.  The authors also concluded that 
asset purchases in large volume by a central bank would have been able to affect the 
price or yield of the target asset, especially in the case of the United States, while the 
evidence on the effectiveness of these policies was more mixed for Japan.   
Our paper also uses a version of the macro-finance, no-arbitrage model of the 
term structure to assess the effectiveness of the BOJ’s policies so far adopted
1.  The 
major contribution of this paper is the explicit modeling of the counterfactual, i.e., the 
monetary policy rule that would have been adopted in the absence of the kind of 
commitment the BOJ has made.  By doing so, we are able to estimate more precisely 
than other authors the effect of the commitment on interest rates.    In our formulation of 
the policy that the BOJ has adopted and the counterfactual, we take into account 
explicitly the non-linearity of the rules arising from the zero lower bound on nominal 
interest rates.    In contrast, Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) formulated a monetary 
policy rule, in the framework of a vector autoregression, that takes account of a zero 
lower bound but does not explicitly involve the zero rate commitment.  We consider 
our formulation to be effective in distinguishing the effects of the zero rate commitment 
from other factors, and thus more effective in assessing the independent effects of 
QMEP as well.   
To preview the conclusion of this paper briefly, the BOJ’s monetary policy under 
the zero interest rate environment since 1999 has functioned mainly through the zero 
rate commitment, which has reduced medium- to long-term interest rates.  The 
portfolio rebalancing effect -- either by the BOJ’s ample supply of liquidity or by its 
purchases of long-term government bonds (JGBs [Japanese government bonds]) -- on 
the risk premium component of interest rates has not been found to be significant.  
There is some evidence that raising the reserve target has been perceived by the market 
as a signal indicating the BOJ’s greater willingness to carry on QMEP and thus 
enhanced the effects of the zero rate commitment, although this interpretation is subject 
to further examination.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.    In section 2, we discuss the 
recent development of Japan’s economy and monetary policy as a background for 
analysis.  Section 3 presents our methodology of analysis, including model estimation 
and simulation procedures.    In section 4, we present the results of decomposition of the 
                                                  
1 The macro-finance approach, which was recently broadened by the important work of Ang 
and Piazzesi (2003) and Piazzesi (2005), has the advantage of using market data in combination 
with macroeconomic data, and is thus effective in analyzing the effects of the economic 
structure and monetary policy on long-term interest rates.  3
medium- to long-term interest rates in Japan into expectations and risk premium 
components, and assess the effect of the zero interest rate commitment.  In section 5, 
we conduct a regression analysis of the effects of QMEP, focusing on the expansion of 
reserves at the BOJ and the increase in its purchase of JGBs.    Finally, in section 6, we 
summarize our analyses and consider issues for future study.   
 
 
2.    Background: The Japanese Economy and Monetary Policy in the Recent 
Era 
 
2. 1    Recent Development of the Economy and Monetary Policy in Japan 
Here we will provide an overview of the recent development of the economy and 
of monetary policy in Japan.  Since the burst of the asset price bubble in the early 
1990s, Japan has been experiencing a long economic slump.  The slump is 
characterized by several deep cyclical downturns that were followed by modest 
short-lived economic recoveries.  Real GDP grew at an anemic 1% on average for 
1991-2002    Movements of the rate of change of GDP and CPI in this period are shown 
in Figure 1 (i).    There is a consensus among economists that one of the basic structural 
problems in Japan has been the non-performing loans in the banking sector which 
reflected excessive debts in the corporate sector.
2  The impaired balance sheets of the 
sectors have prevented the transmission mechanism of monetary easing from working 
smoothly.   In addition, the BOJ has faced the zero lower bound constraint on nominal 
interest rates since 1999.  Thus, as Figure 1 (ii) presents, the ratio of the monetary 
base to nominal GDP has moved sharply upward since the mid 1990s, and the rate of 
growth of bank loans has been either near zero or negative since 1994.  The money 
supply (M2+CD) has grown at much lower rates than the monetary base, as shown in 
Figure 1 (iii), that is, the money multiplier has declined sharply.   
In terms of monetary policy, as Figure 1 (ii) shows, the BOJ had little room for 
further reductions in interest rates as early as 1995.  The BOJ maintained the 
uncollateralized overnight call rate as low as approximately 0.5 percent from September 
1995 to September 1998 to stimulate the economy and to contain the strains in the 
financial system generated by failures of large financial institutions during this period.  
The BOJ then successively lowered the overnight call rate to virtually zero percent in 
February 1999.  The so-called zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) had been implemented 
                                                  
2  Details on the banking problems in Japan in the 1990s are explained by Ueda (2000).  4
in the period between April 1999 and August 2000.
3  The ZIRP was not just a zero 
short-term interest rate, but a commitment to maintain it until a pre-announced 
condition was fulfilled.  Specifically, the BOJ Governor announced in April 1999 that 
the Bank would continue the zero rate until deflationary concerns were dispelled.    This 
can be interpreted as an example of the zero rate commitment to be more formally 
analyzed later in this paper.  In August 2000, the BOJ lifted the ZIRP and raised the 
overnight call rate to 0.25 percent, since the economy was recovering and showing 
some signs of overcoming deflation.  In late 2000, however, the economy began to 
deteriorate again, reflecting a global decline in the demand for IT goods, raising 
deflationary concerns again.    The BOJ lowered the policy interest rate to 0.15 percent, 
and then adopted the QMEP in March 2001.  The QMEP is still in effect as of the 
writing of this article (April 2005). 
The QMEP has consisted of three pillars.  First, the BOJ has maintained an 
ample liquidity supply by using the current account balances (CABs) at the BOJ as the 
main operating policy target.  Second, the BOJ has commited itself to maintaining the 
provision of ample liquidity until the rate of change of the core CPI (nationwide, 
excluding perishables) becomes zero percent or higher on a sustained basis.    Third, the 
BOJ has increased the amount of purchases of JGBs from time to time as a tool for 
liquidity injection.  It was projected that increasing the CAB targets beyond the level 
of the required reserves would normally keep the call rate near zero percent.
4  Thus,  if 
one focuses on the policy interest rate, the QMEP can be interpreted as a revised version 
of the ZIRP (RZIRP), which also contains the provision of a zero rate commitment.
5  
The details of this commitment were further clarified in October 2003, with the BOJ 
stating its intention to continue providing ample liquidity until both actual and expected 
inflation become zero percent or higher.
6   
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the target and actual CABs under the QMEP in 
Japan.
7  The target CABs increased from approximately 5 trillion yen at the 
                                                  
3  See, for example, Ueda (2002) regarding monetary policy in Japan in this period. 
4 In fact, the uncollateralized overnight call rate declined to 0.001 or 0.002 percent, almost 
literally to zero percent, during the QMEP period, while it declined to at most 0.01 percent 
during the ZIRP period. 
5 The effect of the zero rate commitment on the private sector’s expectations of future policy 
rate is often called “Jikan-jiku Koka” (“policy duration effect”) in Japan. 
6  For further details on the QMEP, see the BOJ’s website (http://www.boj.or.jp). 
7 The actual CABs at the BOJ on a quarterly average basis, adjusted to exclude the effects of 
Y2K and semiannual book closings, are shown in Figure 10.  5
introduction of the QMEP in March 2001, an amount roughly 1 trillion yen greater than 
the then-required CABs, to a range of approximately 30-35 trillion yen in January 
2004.
8  The increases in CABs have been provided mainly by market operations, 
including the BOJ’s purchases of JGBs.  The amount of monthly purchases of JGBs 
has been set and pre-announced by the BOJ.  This amount was equivalent to 0.4 




2. 2  Possible Transmission Channels of Monetary Policy under the Zero Interest 
Rate Environment in Terms of Effects on Long-Term Interest Rates 
We will now provide an overview of the possible transmission channels of the 
ZIRP and QMEP in Japan with reference to Bernanke and Reinhart’s (2004) discussion.   
While each channel would have its own benefits and costs, this paper focuses on the 
investigation of the degree of benefit, that is, the effect of lowering long-term rates.   
Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) presented three alternative monetary strategies for 
stimulating the economy without lowering the current policy rate.  They were: (i) 
shaping interest-rate expectations -- that is, providing assurance to the private sector that 
policy rates will be lower in the future than currently expected; (ii) altering the 
composition of the central bank’s balance sheet to change the relative supplies of 
securities in the market; and (iii) expanding the size of the central bank’s balance sheet 
beyond the level required to set the short-term policy rate at zero.  The ZIRP and the 
RZIRP component of QMEP are examples of strategy (i).  While it seems that the 
theoretical foundation has been established for the effectiveness of strategy (i) in 
general, the effectiveness of its specific application in Japan will be assessed in section 
4 of this paper.
10  As a possible case of adoption of strategy (ii), we can consider the 
increase in the BOJ’s purchases of JGBs in the QMEP period.  Such an increase may 
generate portfolio rebalancing effects, although none of the BOJ’s statements have 
mentioned any intent to produce this sort of effect.  We will assess the significance of 
                                                  
8  Regarding the demand and supply of central bank reserves near zero interest rates, Oda (2002) 
provides a theoretical perspective based on Japan’s experience.    As for the technical aspects of 
open market operations under the QMEP, Maeda et al. (2005) provide explanations based on 
their experience at the BOJ’s Operations Desk. 
9  Actual purchases on a quarterly basis are presented in Figure 12 (i). 
10 While section 4 of this paper assesses the effect of the zero rate commitment in terms of its 
influence on long-term interest rates, Oda and Nagahata (2005) investigate the effect of the 
commitment on macroeconomic variables from a perspective of social welfare.  6
this possibility in subsection 5.2.  Regarding strategy (iii), an example of which is the 
expansion of the CABs at the BOJ in the QMEP period, Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) 
further discussed three possible channels: (a) the portfolio rebalancing effect, whereby 
the increases in the monetary base would lead the private sector to rebalance its 
portfolios, lowering yields on alternative, non-monetary assets; (b) altering expectations 
of the future path of policy rates by a visible act of setting and meeting a high reserve 
target; and (c) the expansionary fiscal effect, whereby the central bank replaces public 
holdings of interest-bearing government debt with non-interest-bearing currency or 
reserves, thus replacing the expected future tax liability for the public with an inflation 
tax.    In this paper, the effectiveness of channel (a) in the case of Japan’s QMEP will be 
assessed in subsection 5.2.  The effectiveness of channel (b), which we call the 
signaling effect, will be investigated for the case of Japan in subsection 5.1.  In 
addition, we also consider whether or not a similar signaling effect can be found with 
respect to the increase in the BOJ’s purchase of JGBs, instead of in the expansion of its 
overall balance sheet, in this subsection.  We will not examine the effectiveness of 
channel (c) in this paper.   
 
 
3.  Methodology 
 
This section presents the methodology used to decompose long-term interest rates 
into expectations and risk premium components.  Here we will use a macro-finance 
model
11, building on Oda and Kobayashi (2003), that combines a small macroeconomic 
model with a finance theory approach.   
 
3. 1    Model of the Economy   
We assume a small backward-looking model, shown by equations (1)-(7) below, 
consisting of aggregate demand and supply equations (IS/AS) and a monetary policy 
rule (MP).  The IS and AS equations are both of simple backward-looking types, 
whereby the present GDP gap is determined by past GDP gaps and real interest rates 
and the present inflation rate is determined by past inflation rates and GDP gap.  
                                                  
11 Examples of the application of the macro-finance approach to studies of the effects of 
monetary policy include Rudebusch and Wu (2003) and Hördahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2004).  
The analysis in this paper is different from these earlier reports in its explicit recognition of the 
nonlinearity of the monetary policy rule, i.e., the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and 
the zero rate commitment by the BOJ.  7
Demand and supply shocks are assumed to be AR(1)  processes.  In terms of monetary 
policy, the default policy rule (a “type 1 rule”) is set as a modified Taylor rule, that 
incorporates slow policy adjustment and recognizes the zero lower bound constraint on 
nominal interest rates.  The BOJ’s commitment to maintaining a zero short rate until 
consumer price inflation becomes positive (the ZIRP/RZIRP) is modeled as the 
maintenance of a zero rate until inflation exceeds the threshold rate (x) under the “type 2 
rule,”
12 which is applied for the relevant periods: 1999/Q2-2000/Q2 and 2001/Q2-the 
latest quarter (2003/Q4).    In other words, the type 1 rule is assumed to be the rule that 
was in place when the BOJ was not using the type 2 rule.  Also, it is used as a 
counterfactual against which to gauge the effect of the zero rate commitment in the type 
2 rule. 
The model is estimated by the maximum likelihood method using Japanese data 
from 1980/Q1 to 1999/Q1.  The choice of this estimation period reflects the adoption 
of the ZIRP in 1999/Q2; thus we simply assume equation (3) below for the estimation of 
monetary policy, without considering the zero lower bound and the zero rate 
commitment.  In the simulations reported below to analyze the effects of the BOJ’s 
policies after 1999, we do replace the type 1 rule by the type 2 rule, but assume that the 
parameters of the model remained the same for the period after 1999/Q2.  Thus, 
equation (5) for the type 2 rule is assumed to be the same as the equation (3) for the type 
1 rule, for example. 
 
The equations of the estimated model are as follows.    Numbers in parentheses are 
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12 An alternative formulation for the zero rate commitment would be to assume the threshold 
rate as fixed.    This might be more in line with the BOJ’s ongoing pronouncements.    However, 
given that the ZIRP was the first such policy implemented, the market’s perception of the nature 
of the framework seems to have evolved over time.  Under the RZIRP, the commitment to 
maintain the QMEP until the CPI “registers stably a zero percent or an increase year on year” on 
a sustained basis must mean that the threshold rate is positive rather than strictly zero.  
Moreover, the clarification of the commitment in October 2003 to include a reference to 
expected inflation may have raised the threshold rate.  Thus, it seems plausible to model the 
threshold rate as time-variant. 
(0.048)     (0.048)     (0.042) 
(0.102)     (0.117)     (0.126)  8
(Monetary Policy Rule) 
• Type 1: rule without a zero rate commitment (through 1999/Q1 and 2000/Q3- 
2001/Q1)  
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• Type 2: rule with a zero rate commitment (1999/Q2-2000/Q2 and 2001/Q2-2003/Q4) 
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<Notation> 
yt: output gap, defined as a percentage deviation from the potential output.   
t π : inflation rate, defined as the year-on-year changes in the CPI (excluding 
perishables).  
n
t r : natural rate of interest, modeled as  const y y r t t
n
t + − = − ) (
*
1
* .  
*
t y : potential output, defined as a logarithmic value of the HP-filtered real GDP 
(seasonally adjusted).   
t i : nominal short-term interest rate, defined as the overnight uncollateralized call 
rate.  
*
t i : nominal short-term interest rate in a case with neither the zero lower bound 
constraint nor the zero rate commitment.   
*
t π : targeted inflation rate, which is set at 1.81%, the average of the realized rate 
during the estimation period.   
t π : two-quarter backward moving average of inflation rate. 
x: the threshold rate of inflation for exiting the zero rate commitment (also see 
(0.055)  
(0.079)         (0.079)             (0.134)          (0.305) 
(0.105)   9
below). 
 
3. 2  Decomposition of Interest Rates into Expectations and Risk Premium 
Components by Monte-Carlo Simulation 
We combine the macro model, estimated above, with the no-arbitrage asset pricing 
theory in finance in order to derive a model-based yield curve.  We assume that the 
threshold rate of inflation in the type 2 monetary policy rule, as well as the market 
prices of risk associated with aggregate demand and supply shocks to the goods market, 
are time-variant and are estimated simultaneously from the yield curve observed in the 
market at each point in time.
13  Note that the threshold rate of inflation under the 
RZIRP can be recognized by market participants to be positive, since the BOJ 
announced its intention to maintain the RZIRP until the consumer price index 
(excluding perishables, on a nationwide basis) inflation becomes stably above zero.  
The perceived threshold rate may change, since the market participants can update their 
inferences based on developing information regarding the monetary policy stance.     
Given the threshold rate and the market prices of risks, the model-based yield 
curve Rt
T, i.e., the interest rate at t on a bond maturing at T, can be described as follows.   















t ds i E , 
(9) 
where ) , ( T t P   is the price at t of a discount bond maturing at T.  Here,  t i ˆ  denotes  the 
path of the short-term interest rate in the future, 
Q
t E   is the expectations operator under 
the Martingale measure (that is, the risk-neutral measure), and the circumflexes (^) on 
the stochastic variables hereinafter mean that these variables are defined under the 
Martingale measure.    The stochastic process for  t i ˆ   is determined by the macro model 
composed of equations (1)-(8) under the Martingale measure.     
The macro model is driven by the demand and supply shocks, which can be 
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13  For the period without the ZIRP/RZIRP, only the market prices of risk are estimated from the 
yield curve observed in the market and used for the simulation explained in this subsection.  10
where 
d
t dB  and 
s
t dB   denote the increments of standard  Brownian  motion.  Based  on 
the no-arbitrage pricing theory,
14 these stochastic processes are transformed into 
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where 
d λ  and 
s λ  denote the market prices of risk regarding the demand and supply 
shock, respectively.  Given the threshold rate, the market prices of risk, and the initial 
value of endogenous economic variables, we can calculate equation (9) numerically.  
That is, we conduct Monte-Carlo simulations to derive the future paths of the output gap, 
inflation, and the short-term interest rate under the Martingale measure, starting from 
the initial state of the economy at the time of observation.
15,16  This leads to a 
model-based yield curve.  Macroeconomic data used as initial values are presented in 
Figures 3, 4, and 5. 
We then estimate the threshold rate ( t x ) and the market prices of risk (
d
t λ , 
s
t λ ) 
for each quarter (t) such that the model-based yield curve (Rt
T) best fits the yield curve 
(
T
t R ) observed in the market.
17  Specifically, we search for the values that minimize 
the sum of the square errors at 20 grid points (denoted by i below), set at every other 
quarter (i.e., every six months) on the yield curve, between the two curves.  This 




















t t λ λ
.  (14) 
Once we find the optimal value of the threshold rate, we derive the expectations 
component of medium- to long-term interest rates by calculating equation (9) under 
                                                  
14  Examples of standard literature on this issue are Duffie (2001) and Hull (2001). 
15 We cannot calculate this analytically since the policy rule includes nonlinearity due to the 
zero rate commitment and the zero lower bound constraint. 
16 Each simulation is conducted 1,000 times; that is, a thousand paths are used to calculate the 
expected value in equation (9).    For the simulations, the natural rate of interest in the future is 
set at a constant 1.05%.  This value is the average of the past natural rate in the period from 
1995 to 2003, during which the natural rate was stable; thus the value seems plausible as a 
perceived rate for the future. 
17 The observed yield curve is derived for the maturity of zero to ten years by McCulloch’s 
(1971) method from the price data of all JGBs outstanding. 
18  For this optimization, we adopted the Downhill Simplex method.  11
subjective probability, not under the Martingale measure, with a Monte-Carlo 
simulation, whereby the threshold rate is set at the optimal value and both market prices 
of risk are set at zero.  We obtain the risk premium component of the medium- to 
long-term interest rates by subtracting the expectations component from the 
model-based interest rate.   
 
 
4 .   A n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  Z e r o  I n t e r e s t  R a t e  C o m m i t m e n t  a n d  i t s  E f f e c t s  o n  
Medium- to Long-Term Interest Rates   
 
In this section, we show the results of decomposing the medium- to long-term 
interest rates in Japan into two components for the period of 1995/Q1-2003/Q4, and the 
results of estimating the threshold rate of inflation for the period during which the zero 
rate commitment is in effect.   
 
4. 1  Expectations and Risk Premium Components of Medium- to Long-Term 
Interest Rates 
Before investigating the effect of the zero rate commitment, let us review the 
development of medium- to long-term interest rates in Japan since mid 1990’s.    Figure 
6 shows the estimation results for model-based interest rates, and their expectations 
components and risk premium components at ten-, five-, and three-year maturities for 
the period of 1995-2003.  Table 1 shows a summary of Figure 6, presenting the 
development of average interest rates for each of the three time phases; i.e., 1995-97, 
1998-2000, and 2001-03.    The table and figure indicate the following.   
• The average of the interest rate at each maturity decreased phase by phase, as shown 
in the table, because both expectations and risk premium components decreased.     
• Looking at the figure, we see that during the period of 1995-97, the interest rate at 
each maturity decreased significantly, declining by more than 50% in the three years.   
This is attributed to the decrease in the risk premium component
19 while the 
                                                  
19 The reason for such a large decrease in the risk premium component in this period is not 
explicitly investigated here.  One possibility may be the influence of the decrease in overseas 
long-term interest rates, especially those in the United States, in this period.  This would 
reduce the long-term interest rates in Japan through market arbitrage.  Since the structural 
model in this paper does not take into account such an open economy effect, the expectations 
component would not change in this case and the risk premium component would be estimated 
to be reduced.  To correct for such a possibility, the IS curve in the model should be modified 
to an open economy version, one that takes into account the effects of overseas interest rates and  12
expectations component was increasing gradually in this period, reflecting the 
economic environment of the time.   
• During the period of 1998-2000, the interest rate at each maturity and the associated 
components were relatively stable.   
• At the beginning of the period of 2001-03, when the QMEP was introduced, the 
interest rate at each maturity and both of the associated components became lower 
than in the former period.  From then until the first half of 2002, the rate and the 
components were relatively stable.  However, in the year from 2002/Q3 to 
2003/Q2, the interest rates gradually decreased again, mainly due to the decrease in 
the risk premium component, reaching historical lows in 2003/Q2, as shown in the 
table; the risk premium at each maturity also declined to near zero.  This was a 
time of global deflation scare and the rising bond market.  Our model may not be 
adequately capturing such changes in expectations.    From 2003/Q2 to 2003/Q4, the 
interest rates turned upward led by increases in both expectations and risk premium 
components.  The increase in the expectations component seems to correspond to 
the economic recovery that was taking hold.   
 
4. 2    Perceptions of the Details of the Zero Interest Rate Commitment 
Figure 7 presents an estimate of the threshold inflation rate for the period under 
the ZIRP and RZIRP.  While the threshold rate by definition reflects the necessary 
condition for exiting the ZIRP/RZIRP, this threshold can be interpreted as the perceived 
degree of monetary easing when the economy is stuck at the zero bound.
20   
Looking at the figure, the characteristics of the estimated threshold inflation rate 
are summarized as follows.   
• During the ZIRP period, the threshold rate was within a relatively low range and 
decreased over time until the policy was terminated in 2000/Q3.  In particular, the 
threshold rate was nearly zero in the first half of 2000.  This is consistent with the 
comments of some BOJ board members in this period concerning the desirability of 
discontinuing the ZIRP in the near future.   
• During the RZIRP period, the threshold rate was low, in the 0.0%-0.1% range, in the 
first five quarters after the introduction of the policy.  It would appear that this 
                                                                                                                                                  
exchange  rates.  This  remains as an issue for the future. 
20 Oda and Nagahata (2005) adopt a different approach to describing the accommodative 
monetary policy stance near the zero rate.  They use a “nonlinear optimal simple policy rule,” 
devised by modifying a Taylor-type rule, to describe preemptive monetary easing and compare 
the effects on social welfare with the effects of policy rules featuring a zero rate commitment.  13
feature was an extension from the end of the ZIRP period.   
• The threshold rate jumped upward in 2002/Q3 and continued to increase until 
2003/Q2.  As we see in Figures 4 and 5, this was a period of gradual economic 
recovery, and expected future short-term interest rates would have gone up without 
the RZIRP.  However, increases in the expectations component of interest rates 
were largely contained until 2003/Q2, as shown in Figure 6, because of the effect of 
the RZIRP with a relatively high threshold rate.  Thus, the medium to long-term 
interest rates continued to fall in this period along with a decrease in the risk 
premium component.   
There is more than one possible interpretation of this increase in the threshold rate 
during 2002/Q3-2003/Q2.  While no explicit statements were made during this period 
to enhance the effectiveness of the commitment, the BOJ had been increasing the target 
CABs and its outright purchase of JGBs, as shown in Figures 2 and 12, which might 
have had some signaling effects.  These hypotheses will be assessed later in 
subsections 5.1.1 and 5.2.1, respectively.  An alternative interpretation is that the 
market’s perception of the economic outlook may have been weaker than assumed in 
the simulation
21.    This may have resulted in higher estimates of the threshold rate than 
the market had in fact anticipated.   
However, it is not easy to explain why the estimate of the threshold rate remains 
near 1 percent for the second half of 2003.  If anything, the market seems to have 
become suspicious of the BOJ’s intention to continue the RZIRP and pushed up 
long-term interest rates in the summer of that year.  It could be argued, however, that 
even the seemingly sharp rise in interest rates at the time may have been mild relative to 
improvements in market expectations and thus could be consistent with a higher 
threshold rate.  In addition, the BOJ responded by clarifying the commitment in 
October, as described in section 2.  These forces may have cancelled each other out, 
resulting in minor movement in the threshold rate.  Still, the estimate of the threshold 
rate at approximately 1.0 percent seems disproportionately high in light of the current 
commitment and thus requires explanation.
22  
                                                  
21 We may note that this was a period during which deflation or disinflation was a worldwide 
threat. 
22  It might be possible that the estimate of the threshold rate is somewhat biased upward for the 
following reason. In this paper, the monetary policy rule is formulated and estimated as linear, 
except for the zero rate commitment element.    However, in the zone in which the policy rate is 
close to zero but is positive, the actual policy rule may be more aggressive in the sense of 
guiding rates to lower levels than the policy rule assumed here.  Thus, the actual rule may be 
nonlinear, being more accommodative and involve an element of preemptive easing.  As Oda  14
 
4. 3    Effects of the Zero Interest Rate Commitment 
To investigate the effects of the zero interest rate commitment for the 
ZIRP/RZIRP periods, we will derive the hypothetical long-term interest rates and their 
components that would have obtained if the commitment had not been implemented for 
the period.  Note that we have already derived a model-based yield curve and 
associated components under the zero rate commitment in subsection 3.2 using 
Monte-Carlo simulations. Given the market prices of risk estimated by the above 
simulation, another set of simulations is conducted in a similar way, although based on 
the structural model with the type 1 policy rule, i.e., on a version without the 
commitment, instead of on the type 2 rule.   
Figure 8 (i)-(iii) presents an estimate of the expectations component of the interest 
rates at three-, five-, and ten-year maturity for both cases; i.e., under the zero rate 
commitment and without the commitment.  The difference between the two cases can 
be interpreted as the effect of the zero rate commitment on the interest rates, which is 
shown in Figure 8 (iv).  Similarly, Figure 9 (i)-(iii) presents an estimate of the risk 
premium component for the two cases at each maturity and Figure 9 (iv) shows the 
effect of the zero rate commitment.   
With reference to Figure 8, we find that the estimated expectations component of 
the interest rates at all maturities are lower in the case of the commitment policy.    The 
differences between the two cases began to increase from 2002/Q3, and expanded 
sharply in 2003, because the expected future short-term interest rates without the zero 
rate commitment went up (probably in response to improving economic conditions), 
while the commitment to a large extent contained the increases.  This result is 
consistent with the findings in subsection 4.2.    In general, the ZIRP and RZIRP imply a 
promise to maintain a zero interest rate, even after the interest rate under the modified 
Taylor rule rate turns positive, unless the exit condition based on the CPI measure is met.   
Thus, the difference in expected three-year interest rates, say, between the modified 
Taylor rule and the ZIRP or RZIRP, is small if the interest rate under the Taylor rule is 
expected to remain negative for three years or more.    The difference becomes larger as 
                                                                                                                                                  
and Nagahata (2005) point out, the market may have regarded the introduction of the ZIRP and 
QMEP as a sign of more aggressive policy stance by the BOJ and have changed the perceived  
policy rule from linear to nonlinear in the neighborhood of a zero rate.  Then, interest rates 
would be lower even without a rise in the threshold rate.  Our estimates of the threshold rate, 
which does not take into account such nonlinearity, would then be higher than the value 
perceived in the market.  15
investors start to consider the possibility that the interest rate under the Taylor rule will 
turn positive within three years but that the exit condition would not yet be met.  This 
may have been the situation in 2003, as can be seen in Figure 8.  If the expected 
period during which the commitment will continue to be binding is relatively short, the 
difference in rates on the three-year horizon will be larger than that on the ten-year 
horizon, because the commitment is expected to become non-binding as the economy 
approaches the steady state in the future.  This may also have been the situation in 
2003 as indicated in Figure 8 (iv).   
Figure 9 shows that the effects of the commitment on the risk premium 
component of interest rates have been limited, with the exception of the period after 
2003/Q2, for the three-year interest rate.  The effects are almost negligible for the 
ten-year interest rate.    This seems reasonable if the expected duration of a zero interest 
rate is relatively short.  The commitment reduces uncertainties about the duration of a 
zero interest rate; hence it can contain the risk premium component of the interest rate 
for relatively short maturities.  This could explain the emergence of the difference 
between the two cases of the three-year rate during 2003/Q2-Q4.  Meanwhile, sharp 
reductions in risk premiums are observed during 2002/Q3-2003/Q1, both with and 
without the commitment.  This may have been due to the stabilization of the inflation 
rate at low levels in late 2002 and 2003.   
 
 
5.  Regression  Analysis  of  Quantitative Monetary Easing Effects 
 
In this section we report on the results of analyses regarding the various potential 
effects of the QMEP, other than the “policy duration effect” of the RZIRP already 
examined, using simple regressions based on the results of section 4.    Specifically, we 
analyze the possibility of policy effects of the expansion of the CAB target and of the 
BOJ’s purchases of JGBs from two perspectives: (i) whether or not the policy has a 
signaling effect on the perceived details of the zero rate commitment; and (ii) whether 
or not the policy is capable of reducing the risk premium component of medium- to 
long-term interest rates.     
 
5. 1    Testing for the Signaling Effect 
As we have implicitly assumed in the above analysis, the BOJ’s commitment 
regarding the threshold inflation rate under the type 2 rule has been vague.  Under the 
QMEP, the BOJ effectively promised to keep a zero rate “until core CPI inflation is  16
stably above zero.”  This statement can be consistent with a fairly wide range of the 
threshold rate.    In October 2003 the statement was revised to read “until at least actual 
and expected inflation are above zero.”    The revised statement still contains an element 
of ambiguity because actual and expected inflation turning positive are only necessary, 
but not sufficient conditions for an exit.  Under such an environment, any policy 
statement and/or action by the BOJ has the potential of affecting the market’s perception 
of the threshold rate, i.e., may generate signaling effects. 
We assume that the expansion of the CAB target and the BOJ’s outright purchases 
of JGBs are possible such signaling actions.  We will assess the possibility of the 
signaling function of these actions by investigating whether or not a given action 
influenced the commitment effect, defined in subsection 4.3, on the expectations 
components of interest rates.   
Based on this consideration, we regressed the effects of the zero rate commitment, 
shown in Figure 8, on the CABs at the BOJ (Figure 10) and the BOJ’s purchases of 
JGBs (Figure 12 (i)), assuming a disturbance term of AR(1).  Table 2 presents the 
estimation results.  For each of the ten-, five-, and three-year interest rates, the 
coefficient of the CABs is statistically significant and positive, suggesting a signaling 
effect, although the estimated value of the coefficient is not large.
23  In contrast, for 
each interest rate, the coefficient of the BOJ’s purchases of JGBs is not necessarily 
statistically significant and is negative.    These results do not change qualitatively even 
if the regressions are conducted with only one explanatory variable --either the CABs or 
the BOJ’s purchases of JGBs.    Thus, the results lead to the tentative conclusion that the 
expansion of the CABs may have been perceived by the market as indicating a greater 
willingness on the part of the BOJ to carry out RZIRP.
24  
Other interpretations, however, are possible.  One such possibility is that the 
signal was mainly generated by various types of communication between the BOJ and 
the market as the CAB target was changed -- for example, the BOJ governor’s 
                                                  
23 The estimate shows that an increase of ten trillion yen in the CABs at the BOJ is likely to 
lower the ten-, five-, and three-year interest rate by 0.11%, 0.17%, and 0.19%, respectively. 
24  It is somewhat dangerous to read too much into this result.    Whether or not a change in the 
CAB target has such a signaling effect depends on the degree of the public’s understanding of 
monetary policy in the zero rate environment.  In general, the more uncertain the public is on 
the policy stance, as in the early period of the ZIRP and RZIRP, the larger is the signaling effect 
caused by a policy action of a central bank.  Thus, the record of signaling in the past may not 
necessarily suggest the possibility of signaling in a similar magnitude in the future.    Especially, 
when the public becomes certain about the policy stance, the change in the CAB target may 
have no signaling effect.    17
comments at regular press conferences and the issuance of BOJ’s formal documents, 
such as “The Enhancement of Monetary Policy Transparency” in October 2003 -- rather 
than being generated by the changes in the CAB itself.  It remains to be seen whether 
or not the above tentative conclusion will still stand in analysis using a larger data set 
and a model with more explanatory variables relating to this alternative interpretation.   
 
5. 2    Testing for the Effect on the Risk Premium of Interest Rates 
Finally, we estimate two sets of equations regarding the possible effects of the 
expansion of the CABs and the BOJ’s outright purchases of JGBs on the risk premium.   
First, we regressed the risk premium components of medium- to long-term interest 
rates, shown in Figure 6, on the CABs (Figure 10) and the share of JGBs held by the 
BOJ in total JGBs outstanding (Figure 12 (ii)) along with two other variables and a 
constant, assuming an AR(1) structure for the disturbance term.    This was to determine 
whether or not such BOJ’s open market operations eased the demand-supply balance in 
the bond market or other non-monetary assets and, as a result, lowered the risk premium 
through the portfolio rebalancing effect.    We included the CABs in the regression since 
their expansion has been accompanied by increases in various open market operations,
25 
which may have affected the risk premium through portfolio rebalancing by market 
participants.  The explanatory variables  included the turnover rate of JGBs (Figure 11 
(i)), as a measure of the liquidity premium,
26  and the spread between TB and the banks’ 
CD rates (Figure 11 (ii)), as a proxy for ‘flight to quality’ effects.   
Table 3 presents the results of the regression.  With respect to the coefficient of 
the CABs, the estimate for the ten-year interest rate is negative, suggesting the portfolio 
rebalancing effect, but is statistically insignificant while the coefficient estimates are 
positive for the five- and three-year rates.    With respect to the coefficient of the BOJ’s 
share of JGBs, the estimate for each rate is positive and statistically insignificant.  
Therefore, it seems that the portfolio rebalancing initiated by the BOJ’s open market 
operations of non-monetary assets thus far has had no statistically significant effect on 
reducing the risk premium of medium- to long-term interest rates.    These results do not 
change qualitatively even if the regressions are conducted by omitting either the CABs 
                                                  
25 In order to meet the CAB target the BOJ has conducted various purchasing operations, 
including the acquisition of bills and commercial papers (CPs) in addition to treasury bills (TBs) 
and government bonds (JGBs).  In 2003 the BOJ also began buying asset-backed commercial 
papers (ABCPs) and asset-backed securities (ABSs). 
26 The higher the turnover rate of JGBs, the more liquid the JGB market is and the smaller 
liquidity premium is in the interest rates on JGBs.  18
or the BOJ’s share of JGBs.   
Second, we regressed the risk premium components on the CABs and the flow 
amount of the BOJ’s outright purchases of JGBs in each quarter (Figure 12 (i)) along 
with the same two other variables as above and a constant, assuming again an AR(1) 
structure for the disturbance term.  This was to evaluate the hypothesis that the 
increase in the CAB target or in the BOJ’s purchase of JGBs strengthened the market’s 
confidence on the BOJ’s accommodative policy stance, and thus reduced the uncertainty 
as to the future policy path, leading to a reduction in the risk premium.  As shown in 
Table 4, however, all the coefficients of the CABs and the BOJ’s purchases of JGBs 
were statistically insignificant at all maturities.  Therefore, it appears that the increase 
in these variables has had no statistically significant effect to reduce the risk premium 
for medium- to long-term interest rates.   
 
 
6.  Concluding  Remarks:  Summary of Findings and Further Issues 
 
We have examined empirically the effects of the ZIRP and QMEP in Japan on 
medium- to long-term interest rates using a macro-finance model.  We tentatively 
conclude that the BOJ’s monetary policy under the zero interest rate environment since 
1999 has functioned mainly through the zero rate commitment, which has led to 
reduced medium- to long-term interest rates.  More specifically, the commitment has 
been effective in lowering the expectations component of interest rates, especially with 
short- to medium-term maturities, while it has been less effective in lowering the risk 
premium component.  In contrast, the portfolio rebalancing effect -- either by the 
BOJ’s supplying liquidity beyond the required level to keep the short-term policy rate at 
virtually zero (i.e. the expansion of the CAB at the BOJ) or by the BOJ’s purchases of 
JGBs-- on the risk premium component of the interest rates has not been found 
significant.  There is some evidence that raising the target for the CABs has been 
perceived by the market as a signal indicating the BOJ’s greater willingness to carry on 
RZIRP and has thus enhanced the effects of the zero rate commitment, although this 
interpretation is subject to further examination.   
Several issues remain for further study in connection with this analysis.    Among 
these is the desirability of extending the sample period for analysis  This could enable 
verification of the robustness of our tentative conclusions, especially those of section 5, 
and to choose the correct interpretation for the regression results from among the 
alternatives put forward.  Regarding the structural model of the economy, three  19
interesting challenges remain.  The first challenge is to construct an open economy 
version of the model, since the long-term interest rates in Japan can be affected by 
exchange rates or overseas interest rates, especially those in the United States.  The 
second is to take into account the possible effect of the risk premium component of the 
interest rates on aggregate demand, although it may be difficult to overcome the burden 
of recursive calculation in such a case.  The last challenge is to make the model 
forward-looking.  Meeting these challenges will surely enhance our understanding of 
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      Summary of the estimation results presented in Figure 6
(%) 
 1995/Q1  1998/Q1  2001/Q1
-1997/Q4 -2000/Q4 -2003/Q4 
average average average
 CPI (excluding fresh food), y/y chg. 0.29       -0.14       -0.66       -0.40       0.00      
 Ten-year interest rate (model-based) 3.32       1.91       1.33       0.64       1.53      
 Expectations components 1.23       0.69       0.51       0.66       0.89      
 Risk premium components 2.10       1.21       0.82       -0.03       0.65      
 Five-year interest rate (model-based) 2.14       1.02       0.48       0.24       0.69      
 Expectations components 1.00       0.41       0.22       0.28       0.44      
 Risk premium components 1.13       0.61       0.26       -0.03       0.25      
 Three-year interest rate (model-based) 1.57       0.61       0.18       0.08       0.29      
 Expectations components 0.88       0.26       0.09       0.10       0.19      
 Risk premium components 0.69       0.35       0.09       -0.02       0.10      
2003/Q2 2003/Q4
Table 1: Component Decomposition of Medium- to
              Long-Term Interest Rates
Regression Method: Maximum Likelihood with AR(1)
Period: 1995/Q1-2003/Q4
10-year 5-year 3-year
BOJ’s current account balance 0.011 0.017 0.019
Standard error 0.001 0.003 0.004
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
BOJ’s purchase of JGBs -0.023 -0.031 -0.034
Standard error 0.012 0.017 0.019
P-value 0.06 0.07 0.09
Constant -0.01 -0.03 -0.03
Standard error 0.02 0.05 0.06
P-value 0.63 0.57 0.63
AR(1) 0.70 0.82 0.85
Standard error 0.16 0.15 0.15
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adjusted-R
2 0.91 0.91 0.90
Std. err. of equation 0.02 0.03 0.03
D.W. ratio 1.86 1.60 1.34
Note: The dependent variable is defined as the difference between the expectations
          components with and without the zero rate commitment.
Effects of the zero rate commitment
in the expectations components
Table 2: Regression of the Commitment Effect on the BOJ's
              Current Account Balance and Purchase of JGBsRegression Method: Maximum Likelihood with AR(1)
Period: 1995/Q1-2003/Q4
 10-year 5-year  3-year
BOJ's current account balance -0.016 0.003 0.008
Standard error 0.01 0.01 0.01
P-value 0.23 0.72 0.30
BOJ’s share of JGBs 0.020 0.065 0.061
Standard error 0.07 0.04 0.04
P-value 0.76 0.14 0.13
Turnover rate of JGBs -0.19 -0.17 -0.14
Standard error 0.08 0.06 0.05
P-value 0.02 0.01 0.01
Spread between TB and CD 0.59 0.11 -0.04
Standard error 0.58 0.43 0.38
P-value 0.32 0.81 0.92
Constant 2.00 0.13 -0.26
Standard error 1.27 0.83 0.75
P-value 0.13 0.87 0.73
AR(1) 0.40 0.26 0.29
Standard error 0.16 0.15 0.16
P-value 0.02 0.11 0.08
Adjusted-R
2 0.55 0.40 0.33
Std. err. of equation 0.28 0.21 0.18
D.W. ratio 2.38 2.12 1.82
Note: Regression results for 5- and 3-year rates remain statistically
           insignificant on the BOJ's CAB and share of JGBs, even excluding 
           the turnover rate or the TB-CD spread from explanatory variables.  
           There is an exception for 10-year rate in that the result of regression 
           without the turnover rate shows that the coefficient of the BOJ's CAB 
           is statistically significant (p-value = 0.03), although the estimate may 
           be biased due to omitting the turnover rate, which is a statistically 
           significant explanatory variable in the above table.
Risk premium components
Table 3: Regression of the Risk Premium Component on the
              BOJ's Current Account Balance and Share of JGBsRegression Method: Maximum Likelihood with AR(1)
Period: 1995/Q1-2003/Q4
 10-year 5-year  3-year
BOJ's current account balance -0.009 -0.005 -0.005
Standard error 0.03 0.02 0.02
P-value 0.72 0.81 0.79
BOJ’s purchase of JGBs -0.077 0.025 0.066
Standard error 0.21 0.16 0.15
P-value 0.72 0.88 0.65
Turnover rate of JGBs -0.20 -0.16 -0.13
Standard error 0.08 0.06 0.05
P-value 0.02 0.01 0.03
Spread between TB and CD 0.51 -0.11 -0.20
Standard error 0.55 0.42 0.38
P-value 0.37 0.79 0.59
Constant 2.45 1.29 0.78
Standard error 0.49 0.38 0.34
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.03
AR(1) 0.39 0.29 0.33
Standard error 0.16 0.16 0.17
P-value 0.02 0.08 0.06
Adjusted-R
2 0.55 0.34 0.26
Std. err. of equation 0.27 0.22 0.19
D.W. ratio 2.35 1.99 1.73
Note: Regression results for 10-, 5-, and 3-year rates remain statistically
          insignificant on the BOJ's CAB and purchase of JGBs, even 
          excluding the turnover rate or the TB-CD spread from explanatory 
          variables.
Risk premium components
Table 4: Regression of the Risk Premium Component on the
              BOJ's Current Account Balance and Purchase of JGBsFigure 1: Monetary Indicators, Economic Activity, 
and Price Development in Japan 
 




















































































(1990/Q1 = 1, s.a.)
Monetary base
M2+CDs


























Monetary base / Nominal GDP
 (right scale)
Growth rate of amount outstanding
of bank lending (left scale)
Overnight call rate  (left scale)
(%)
Ten-year interest rate
 (left scale)   Note:*1: Current account balances held by institutions that not subject to reserve requirements.




































































Figure 2: Target Reserve and Actual Balance
             under the Quantitative Monetary EasingFigure 3: Short / Long-Term Interest Rates
Figure 4: Real GDP and GDP Gap










































95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
(y/y % chg.)
    Note: Ten-year interest rate is the yield that is derived based on McCulloch's (1971) method.
Source: Bank of Japan.
    Note: GDP gap is defined as a percentage deviation of the real GDP from the HP-filtered real GDP.
Source: Cabinet Office.
   Note: Adjusted to exclude the effects of the consumption tax hike on the assumption
             that prices of all taxable goods fully reflect the rise in the tax rate.
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.( i ) Ten-year interest rate
( ii ) Five-year interest rate
(iii) Three-year interest rate
               of Medium / Long-term Interest Rates













































































































QMEP/RZIRP period ZIRP period
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003        ( i ) Three-year interest rate
        ( ii ) Five-year interest rate
        ( iii ) Ten-year interest rate
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Figure 8: Expectations Components
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~        ( i ) Three-year interest rate
        ( ii ) Five-year interest rate
        ( iii ) Ten-year interest rate
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Figure 9: Risk Premium Components
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/99 /00 /01 /02 /03
~
~     Note: Adjusted to exclude the effects of Y2K and semiannual book closings.
  Source: Bank of Japan.
   ( i ) Turnover Rate of Japanese Government Bonds
  Source: Japan Securities Dealers Association.
   ( ii ) Spread between TB and Bank's CD Rates (TB-CD)
  Source: Japan Bond Trading Company.
Figure 10: BOJ Current Account Balance
Figure 11: Control Variables of the Regression


























Turnover rates of medium /
long-term JGBs (left scale)
Trading Volume of medium /
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(%)
(trillion yen, average outstandings)
(trillion yen)( i ) BOJ's Transactions of Medium / Long-Term JGBs: Flow and Stock
  Source: Bank of Japan.
( ii ) Share of Medium / Long-term JGBs Held by the BOJ in the Total Amount Outstanding
  Source: Bank of Japan, Japan Securities Dealers Association.
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Amount of JGBs held by the BOJ
(right-scale)
BOJ's outright purchases of JGBs
(left-scale)
(trillion yen) (trillion yen)
(trillion yen)